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NOTE

The Future of Sharia Law
American Arbitration

in

ABSTRACT

A rising tide of Islamophobia in the United States has led,
in recent years, to state-level efforts to prohibit the applicationof
Sharia law in American courts. While these bans have been
largely unsuccessful as legislation-the U.S. Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals has even declared one such ban unconstitutional-the
growing uneasiness among Americans regardingthe application
of Sharia law persists. Similar tensions have been addressed in
Canada and the United Kingdom through reform of the
applicationof Sharia law in alternativedispute resolution (ADR)
mechanisms. By taking a critical look at the American ADR
system through the lens of Canadianand British reforms, a mode
of reconciling religious arbitrationwith egalitarian values, and
concerns, can emerge.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
II.
III.

INTRODUCTION
......................................
SHARIA LAW.......................................
ADR AND SHARIA LAW IN THE UNITED STATES ............

A.
B.
IV.

V.

Arbitrationin the United States.......
.......
Bans on Sharia Law in the United States
and PotentialFearsRegardingADR.................

THE CANADIAN RESPONSE TO SHARIA ARBITRATION....
THE UNITED KINGDOM RESPONSE TO SHARIA
ARBITRATION

VI.

.......................................

COMBATING THE DANGERS TO ARBITRATION
UNDER SHARIA LAW IN THE UNITED STATES................

891

893

897
897
899
908
912
915

I. INTRODUCTION

After the events of September 11th 2001, Americans have become
increasingly uncomfortable with the concept of Sharia law. Fear of the
application of Sharia law within the United States has predominately
891
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manifested in efforts to ban Sharia within the American court system.
Given the growing American belief in the potentially catalytic effects
of the January 9, 2015 attacks on the Parisian magazine, Charlie
Hebdo,' and taking into account the experience of Canada and the
United Kingdom, it is likely that this fear will take on a new target:
the less-formal methods of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) where
the influence of Sharia often finds an outlet.
As an often cheaper, and faster, version of dispute resolution than
that provided in court, arbitration is an increasingly popular version of
ADR. In addition to being perceived as more efficient than in-court
dispute resolution, arbitration also provides parties with the ability to
choose what law and procedures will apply to their dispute. The parties
set out such matters in either a specific arbitration agreement or an
arbitration clause in a broader agreement. Issues sometimes arise,
especially in Western countries, when parties to these agreements
choose to designate religious precepts as the law by which their dispute
will be settled. Given religious precepts provide for different rights and
duties than do secular laws, concerns center around whether some
parties, especially women and children, are disadvantaged by the
application of such precepts in arbitral decisions. These concerns, when
coupled with rising'levels of Islamophobia in Western countries, have
recently produced a pronounced backlash against the application of
Sharia law in arbitral processes, especially in family law matters.
In Ontario, Canada, one such backlash arose as the result of the
creation of the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice and its professed
intention to set up a Sharia arbitration tribunal. 2 The uproar resulted
largely from women and children's rights advocacy groups and resulted
in the Family Statute Law Amendment Act. 3 This Act, while viewed by
many as having created a substantial ban, actually provides a sort of
middle ground approach, allowing arbitration of family law matters so
long as the award is in accordance with Ontario law. 4
By contrast, the United Kingdom is viewed as the most permissive
home to Sharia arbitration among Western countries. This is, however,
a misplaced designation given that the UK's Arbitration Act of 1996
prohibits arbitration of all except civil law matters. This excludes all

1.
See Charlie Hebdo Attack: Three Days of Terror, BBC (Jan. 14, 2015, 5:55
PM), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-30708237 [http://perma.cc/4LUW-DVK9]
(archived Jan. 27, 2015).
2.
See Trevor C.W. Farrow, Re-Framing the Sharia Arbitration Debate, 15
CoNST. F. 79, 79-80 (2006).
3.
See Natasha Bakht, Religious Arbitration in Canada:Protecting Women by
Protecting Them from Religion, 19 CAN. J. WOMEN & L. 119, 130 (2007) (contextualizing
the formation of the No Religious Arbitration Coalition and noting its "succe[ss] in
convincing the government of the dangers of religious arbitration"); Farrow, supra note
2, at 80 (noting that the Ontario Premier's intent to end religious arbitration "ultimately
led to the ... enactment of Ontario's Family Statute Law Amendment Act).
4.
See Bakht, supra note 3, at 129.
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family law as well as criminal disputes. s Thus, UK law actually
attempts to keep a tighter reign on religious arbitral tribunals than
Canadian. A great "moral panic" accompanied the consideration of
further legal powers being ascribed to Sharia tribunals.6 This rising
suspicion of Sharia Law has caused English legislators to take a closer
look and some now fear that family law might actually be considered
arbitrable under the 1996 Act, despite tradition to the contrary, and
now propose a more direct ban via the so-called "Equality" Bill, which
would cement the ban on all consideration of family law matters in
arbitration.7
By examining the debates and modes of dealing with Sharia law
as applied in ADR in both Canada and the UK, one can gain a better
understanding of options open to the United States and modes of
heading off an attack on Sharia ADR in America. The fears that led to
the proposals to ban Sharia law in America are significantly similar to
the sort of fears and concerns that surrounded Sharia reform in
Canada and the UK. In order to anticipate and prevent an attack on
ADR-a vital element of the American legal system-it is important to
understand the threat and consider possible solutions.
The United States can learn from the Canadian and British
examples in order to preserve the application of Sharia law within the
ADR community in a manner that best protects against rights
violations. Part II of this Note explains the basis of Sharia Law. Part
III seeks to explain the background of the concern over the application
of Sharia law in the United States. Part IV and Part V explore how
Canada and the United Kingdom have dealt with similar concerns
directed at ADR mechanisms. Part VI concludes.

II. SHARIA LAW
Sharia law, in its broadest sense, fuses "divine dictates, customary
law, and clerical analogy" to produce civil and criminal laws, religious

5.
See Farrah Ahmed & Jane Calderwood Norton, Religious Tribunals,
Religious Freedom, and Concern for Vulnerable Women, 24 CHILD & FAM. L. Q. 363, 368
(2012).
6.
See Marie Egan Provins, Constructingan Islamic Institute of Civil Justice
that Encourages Women's Rights, 27(3) LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 515, 515--16
(noting the concerns many Canadians voiced over the Islamic Institute for Civil Justice);
cf. Rebecca E. Maret, Note, Mind the Gap: the Equality Bill and ShariaArbitration in
the United Kingdom, 36 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 255, 266-67 (2013) (explaining that
controversy grew as Britons expressed concern that Sharia arbitrations resulted in
gender discrimination against Muslim women).
7.
See Ahmed & Norton, supra note 5, at 369 (noting that the Equality Bill
"proposes to amend the Act to clarify that any matter which is within the jurisdiction of
the family courts cannot be the subject of arbitration proceedings" (footnote omitted)).
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mandates, and codes of personal conduct. 8 As a result of this broad
scope, some even assert that "Sharia law" is a misnomer, given Sharia
is primarily a description of societal aspirations that only become
binding when a governing authority adopts them as law. 9 In this way,
it provides a significant basis for the national law in Saudi Arabia,
Yemen, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain. 10 Sharia is
derived from four recognized sources." The two principle sources of
Sharia are the Qur'an and the sunna.12 These are followed, in order of
importance, by the ijma and the qiyas. There is also a somewhat
controversial potential fifth source of Sharia in the ijtihad.
The Qur'an-the Islamic holy book that provides the central point
of reference for followers of the Islamic faith-is of instrumental value
in interpreting the other three sources of Sharia.13 While it does not
contain a legal code as such, it is the central source for Islamic law
because of the specific legal commands that are found within its
otherwise moral, religious, and devotional content. 14 In fact,
approximately 350 of the 6,235 verses of the Qur'an are said to contain
legal instructions-"ayat al-ahkam"-although this number varies
depending on the interpreting scholar.15 Ayat al-ahkam provide the
basis for Islamic "inheritance, marriage, divorce, commercial
transactions, and criminal law." 16

The second most important source of Sharia law is the sunna,
which are the "collected tales of the life and actions of Muhammad."1 7
Such high importance is allotted to the sunna because the Qur'an itself
states not only that Muslims are "to '[o]bey God and [Muhammad],"
but that Muhammad himself provided an "excellent pattern (of
conduct)." 18 The acts, teachings, and sayings of Muhammad are
preserved in reports, referred to as Hadith, which were compiled into

Jeremy Grunert, How Do You Solve a Problem Like Sharia?Awad v. Ziriax
8.
and the Question of Sharia Law in America, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 695, 704 (2013).
See id.
9.
10.
See Sarah M. Fallon, Justice for All: American Muslims, Sharia Law, and
MaintainingComity with American Jurisprudence, 36 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 153,
166 (2013).
11.
See Grunert, supra note 8, at 705.
12.
See id.
See id. at 705-06.
13.
14.
See id.
15.

See id. at 706 (citing MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, SHARI'AH LAW: AN

INTRODUCTION 20 (2008)); see also D. Andrew Yost, A Waterspring in the Desert:
Advancing Human Rights within Sharia Tribunals, 35 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV.
101, 105 (2011) (commenting that differences in interpretation are due to the fact that
the Qur'an "represents a process of revelation where prior verses may have been later
abrogated in favor of subsequent revelations, and because the revelations themselves
ceased after Muhammad's death, the Islamic community continues to interpret the
meaning of the Qur'an" (emphasis omitted)).
Grunert, supra note 8, at 706.
16.
Id. at 705-07.
17.
Id. at 707 (quoting THE MEANING OFTHE HOLY QUR'AN 3:32, 33:21 ('Abdullah
18.
Yusuf'Ali trans., 11th ed. 2009)).

2015]

FUTURE OF SHARIA LAW IN AMERICAN ARBITRATION

895

the sunna during the early years of Islam by Islamic religious
scholars. e
The third source of Sharia is the ijma, which refers to consensus.
This consensus may occur among religious scholars, or "ulama." 20
Under some interpretations, the consensus necessary for the ijma must
be among the entire Muslim community. 2 1 Whether a scholarly, or
public consensus, the ijma provides the authoritative source for
determining the morality of acts not specifically covered in the
Qur'an. 22 If consensus is reached, this is considered to be a "miraculous
sign proving the infallibility of the community's decision." 23 The
authority for the ijma is based on a belief that Muhammad once said,
"the Muslim community would 'never agree upon an error."' 24
Qiyas is the fourth source of Sharia. Qiyas fills in gaps where the
Muslim community cannot reach consensus.25 As with the ijma, qiyas
are a tool for interpreting the "morality of actions .. . not directly
addressed in the Qur'an." 26 Yet, rather than being based upon mass
consensus, the qiyas relies upon "a form of clerical analogy," involving
comparing the action at issue to similar circumstances addressed in
holy texts or that have been the subject of past clerical rulings.27
Finally, there is also a potential, though somewhat controversial, fifth
source of Sharia. 2 8 This is the ijtihad, which involves the use of
"individual juristic reasoning" to interpret Sharia. 29 While Islamic
religious scholars prohibited use of ijtihad to interpret Sharia in the
10th Century, it has remained a key source of interpretation for certain
branches of Islam. 30 The use of ijtihad is still debated today.3a These
four, sometimes five, sources of Sharia interpretation provide guidance
by which Sharia courts reach judicial decisions. 32 As a result, Sharia
courts frequently produce varied interpretations of "justice" for any
given situation. 33 Further, multiple "extra-Sharia" factors also
typically influence the legal philosophy of Islamic courts, including

See id.
19.
See id. at 707-08.
20.
21.
See id. at 707.
See id.
22.
Id.
23.
Id. (quoting NOEL J. COULSON, A HISTORY OF IsLAMIC LAw 77 (1994)).
24.
See id.
25.
Id.
26.
Id. at 707-08.
27.
See id. at 708.
28.
Yost, supra note 15, at 105.
29.
See Grunert, supra note 8, at 708-09.
30.
See id.
31.
Yost, supra note 15, at 106 (emphasis omitted).
32.
See id. (citing Maria Reiss, The Materializationof Legal Pluralismin Britain:
33.
Why Shari'a Council Decisions Should Be Non-Binding, 26 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 739,
743 (2009) (recognizing legal pluralism in Islamic law)).
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geographic location, state involvement, and the views of the ulama
involved in the hearing. 34
In addition to multiple sources of Sharia, which are generally
agreed on by most Muslims, there are differing schools of Islam, each
of which interprets the content of Sharia law in different ways.3 5 As
mentioned above, there are two main branches of Islam-Shia and
Sunni. The split occurred following the death of Muhammad and was
due to a disagreement over who should be chosen as leader-a caliphin Muhammad's place. 36 Followers of Sunni Islam focus specifically on
the actions of Muhammad, trying to model their lives after tales of his
character, while those who follow Shia Islam focus more on structures
of authority and follow the belief that "the leader of the faith be chosen
from among Muhammad's descendants." 3 7 Shia Islam recognizes a
central legal authority, while Sunni Islam does not.38 Rather than
focusing on the actions of Muhammad alone, the followers of Sunni
Islam consider a number of authorities (muftis) in order to determine
the proper action.39
Out of the same schism that resulted in the development of the
Sunni and Shia branches of Islam, also arose five influential schools of
thought relating to Islamic jurisprudence: the Hanafi, the Maliki, the
Shafi'i, the Hanbali, and the Jafari. 40 The Hanafi School "emphasize[s]
the use of qiyas to [interpret] Sharia in instances where the Qur'an
[and the] sunna" are unclear and where ijma does not exist. 41 The
Maliki School utilizes the four most prominent sources of Sharia, and
adds another source not utilized by any other school-"the customs and
traditions of the people of Medina." 42 Followers of the Maliki School
recognize Medina as "the second holiest city in Islam," after Mecca. 43
The Shafi'i School, keeps to the traditional four sources with emphasis
on the Qur'an and the sunna. 44 The Hanbali School, which is
recognized as the most conservative, focuses almost solely upon the

34.
Id. at 106.
35.
See Grunert, supranote 8, at 709-10.
36.
Id. at 709.
37.
Fallon, supra note 10, at 156, 158-59 (footnote omitted).
38.
Id. at 159 (noting that this process involves determining within which
category of "Sharia values" an action falls, whether it is "required, recommended,
indifferent, disapproved, or forbidden") (citing Jonathan E. Brockopp, Sharia, in 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM AND THE MUSLIM WORLD 618, 618 (Richard C. Martin ed.,
2004)).
39.
See id. (citing Brockopp, supra note 38, at 618).
40.
See Grunert, supranote 8, at 710 (explaining that each school is "named after
the Islamic Scholar whose system of thought and interpretation established its basic
theological and interpretive methodologies") (citing Irshad Abdal-Haqq, Islamic Law: An
Overview of its Origin and Elements, in UNDERSTANDING ISLAMIC LAw: FROM CLASSICAL

TO CONTEMPORARY 1, 24 (Hisham M. Ramadan ed., 2006)).
41.
Id.
42.
See id.
43.
See id.
44.
See id.
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Qur'an and the sunna.45 The Jafari School, popular among Shiites-or
followers of Shia Islam-recognizes the typical four sources, but also
allows the use of the fifth, the ijtihad.46
Western Sharia courts typically serve as a sort of parallel legal
system that nevertheless remains subject to the constitution of the
state in which they reside. 4 7 In such situations, these courts are made
up of a panel of judges educated in Sharia, the binding effect of whose
decisions depends upon the state in which the court presides. 48
Generally while the rulings of such courts are binding in the Middle
East, they are not in the West. 49 The only exception to this is typically
"when litigants have freely agreed to the court's jurisdiction."5 0 For
example, apart from the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal (MAT), there
also exists in England the Islamic Sharia Council.5 1 This Sharia court
operates independently and without oversight; yet, its decisions are not
given binding authority. The Islamic Sharia Council only presides over
arbitration disputes based on agreements in which both parties have
agreed to be governed by Sharia law. 52

III. ADR AND SHARIA LAW IN THE UNITED STATES

A. Arbitration in the United States
The decisions of individuals to solve disputes via arbitration are
recognized in the United States on the basis of contract law principles.
The freedom to make arbitration agreements is derived from the
"freedom to contract" that is protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 53 Such agreements are respected, under American
common law, by the court system so long as the agreement is not
tainted by "fraud, duress, incompetence, [or] unconscionability," or is
incompatible with public policy. 54 This means that such agreements
are enforceable even if the outcome of the arbitration is contrary to
what it would have been had a U.S. court decided the matter, so long

45.
See id. at 711.
46.
See id.
47.
Cf. id. at 725 (explaining that, in the United States, "religious beliefs cannot
trump secular ... law"); Kimberly Karseboom, Note, Sharia Law and America: The
Constitutionalityof Prohibitingthe Considerationof ShariaLaw in American Courts, 10
GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 663, 665-66 (2012).
48.
See Yost, supra note 15, at 107.
49.
See id.
Id.
50.
51.
See Karseboom, supranote 47, at 665.
52.
See Ahmed & Norton, supra note 5, at 367-68, 372.
53.
See Katherine A. Sanoja, Note, The Impact of "Anti-Sharia"Legislation on
Arbitration and Why Judge Nielsen in Florida Got It Right, 8 FIU L. REV. 181, 187
(2012).
See id. at 188.
54.
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as it is not inherently unfair or in contravention of a state statute or
constitution.5 5
In addition to recognition under the common law of contracts,
arbitrations are also given significant weight in American courts
through the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and corresponding state
laws based upon the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA).56 Both
the FAA and the RUAA combine to make decisions by religious
arbitrators binding upon American judges.5 7 As emphasized in Moses
H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corporation,the
Supreme Court has adopted what is now a long-standing liberal policy
toward arbitrations, "mandating that arbitration clauses be read
broadly."5 8 State approaches via the RUAA have largely echoed this
policy, and the FAA has been recognized as "preempt[ing] all
conflicting state laws limiting access to arbitration or refusing to
enforce arbitration agreements voluntarily entered into by the
parties."59 This means that Sharia law bans, in so far as they may
affect the recognition by state courts of arbitration awards made by
religious tribunals, are likely invalid because the FAA preempts such
obstacles to arbitration. 60
American courts, via what is known as the abstention doctrine,
have avoided involvement in reviewing intrafaith disputes that are
based on religious doctrine. 61 While this doctrine was somewhat
loosened by the neutral-principles-of-law approach adopted by the
Supreme Court in Jones v. Wolf, which "allows judges to decide cases
where the underlying dispute can be resolved through the application
of secular legal principles," American judges have nevertheless tended
to steer clear of religious disputes. 62 Some commentators have credited
this approach as having led to increased use of religious arbitration as
63
a substitute for judicial involvement.
Religious arbitrations in the United States are subject to two main
safeguards. First, particularly egregious violations of rights via such

See id. at 188-89.
55.
See Evan M. Lowry, Where Angels Fear to Tread: Islamic Arbitration in
56.
Probate and Family Law, a Practical Perspective, 46 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 159, 159-60
(2013).
57.
See id.
58.
See id. at 163 & n.34 (citing Moses H. Cone Mem'1 Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 22, n.27 (1983)).
59.
Robert L. McFarland, Are Religious Arbitration Panels Incompatible with
Law? Examining "OverlappingJurisdictions"in Private Law, 4 FAULKNER L. REV. 367,
373 (2013) (footnote omitted).
60.
See id. at 373-74.
See Lowry, supra note 56, at 161-62 (noting the doctrine was established by
61.
the Supreme Court in Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1968), and Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976)).
See id. at 162.
62.
See id. at 163.
63.
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arbitrations may be addressed through secular criminal law." Second,
American courts, when exercising their review function, may refuse to
enforce the award. 65 Yet, review of arbitration awards in the United
States is limited. The party contesting the award has the burden of
showing that the arbitration is invalid due to fraud, duress,
incompetence, or unconscionability, that there existed misconduct or
bias on the part of the arbitrator, or that the award is incompatible
with public policy. 66
B. Bans on Sharia Law in the United States and Potential
Fears RegardingADR
Muslim-Americans only "make up less than one percent of the
[United States] population." 6 7 In 2011, the Pew Research Center
estimated that Muslims living in the United States numbered
approximately 2.75 million. 68 "Each year approximately [80,000] to
[90,000] Muslims immigrate to the United States." 6 9 Of those currently
living in the United States, 81 percent are American citizens, and 70
percent of those citizens were born in another country. 70 According to
a study conducted by the Pew Research Center, the 69 percent of
Muslim-Americans who consider religion to be "very important" is
almost exactly that of the 70 percent of Christian-Americans who share
the same viewj' Additionally, both Muslim-Americans and ChristianAmericans have similar rates of religious service attendance. 72
Possibly most important, Muslim-Americans demonstrate the highest
level of integration among all major religious groups currently residing
in the United States, meaning the Muslim-American population keeps
itself less secluded from the general populace than do other religious
groups in the United States.7 3 Compared to Protestant-Americans,
Catholic-Americans,
and Jewish-Americans,
Muslim-Americans
generally demonstrate more acceptance toward members of other

64
See McFarland, supra note 59, at 375, 382.
See id. at 382.
65.
66.
See Lowry, supranote 56, at 164-65.
67.
Fallon, supra note 10, at 154.
68.
Id. at 155.
Id. at 156.
69.
70.
Id. (pointing out that this is a particularly striking figure given that "only
forty-seven percent of all foreign-born immigrants to the United States" have attained
citizenship).
71.
GROWTH

Id. at 157 (citing PEW RESEARCH CTR., MUSLIM AMERICANS: No SIGNS OF
IN ALIENATION OR SUPPORT FOR EXTREMISM 25 (2011), available at

http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-pdflMuslim-American-Report.pdf [http://perma.ccl
FQM7-D6K8] (archived Feb. 16, 2015)).
See id. ("[F]orty-seven percent of Muslims and forty-five percent of
72.
Christians report attending worship services at least weekly." (footnote omitted)).
73.
See id. (citing Bruce Warshal, Sharia Law and Anti-Islam Animus, AM.
MUSLIM (Jan. 26, 2012), http://theamericanmuslim.org/tamphp/features/articles/sharialaw-and-anti-islam-animus [http://perma.cclVA5E-XSNQ] (archived Mar. 24, 2015)).
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religions.7 4 In fact, 96 percent of leaders in Muslim-American mosques
"believe that Muslims ought to be 'involve[d] in American society."' 75
These mosque leaders "'do not envision"' that Islam should take the
form of "a community isolated from the American society."7 6 Generally
speaking, Muslim-Americans are secular and moderate in terms of
their views with respect to many of the issues-like women's rightsthat have divided Muslims and Christians around the world. Contrary
to the views of some Americans, Muslim-Americans have been
described as "'decidedly American in their outlook, values, and
attitudes."' 7 7
In terms of religious affiliation, 65 percent of Muslim-Americans
follow Sunni Islam, and 11 percent follow Shia.7 8 The sect of Sunni
Islam recognizes the Prophet Muhammad, Islam's founder, as its sole
leader. 7 Sunni Muslims strive to "follow[] the traditions and
character of Muhammad."80 The sect of Shia Islam, instead looks to
one of Muhammad's early descendants as its leader. 8 ' The remaining
24 percent of Muslims living in the United States either follow Sufism,
or have no specific branch affiliation.8 2 Sufism differs from Sunni and
Shia Islam in that it focuses on "striving for closeness to God through
mysticism."8 3

Muslim-Americans
have
a
long
historical
presence.
Approximately 10 percent of slaves in the Americas were Muslims
brought from West Africa. 84 The majority of these early MuslimAmericans in America had converted to Christianity by the close of the
Civil War.8 5 Between 1875 and World War II, there was another rise
in the Muslim-American population: in search of economic opportunity,
many immigrated to the United States from the Middle East. 86 During
the 1920s and 1930s, significant numbers of African Americans

74.
75.

Id. (footnote omitted)
Id. (quoting Ihsan Bagby, The Mosque and the American Public Square, in

MUSLIMS' PLACE IN THE AMERICAN PUBLIC SQUARE 323, 325 (Zahid H. Bukhari,

Sulayman S. Nyang, Mumtaz Ahmad & John L. Esposito eds., 2004)).
76.
See id. (quoting Bagby, supra note 75, at 325).
77.

Id. at 158 (quoting PEW RESEARCH CTR., MUSLIM AMERICANS: MIDDLE CLASS

AND MOSTLY MAINSTREAM 1 (2007)) ("Muslim Americans ... [are] largely assimilated,
happy with their lives, and moderate with respect to many of the issues that have divided
Muslims and Westerners around the world. . . . [T]hey are decidedly American in their
outlook, values, and attitudes." (footnote omitted)).
78.
Id. at 156.
79.
See id.
80.
Id.
81.
See id. ("Shia Islam ... mandates that the leader of the faith be chosen from
among Muhammad's descendants." (footnote omitted)).
82.
See id.
83.
Id.
84.
Id. at 157 (citing Edward E. Curtis, IV, United States, Islam, in 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM AND THE MUSLIM WORLD 707, 707 (Richard C. Martin ed.,
2004)).
85.
See id.
86.
See id.
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converted to Islam.8 7 Finally, a new immigration law instituted in
1965 resulted in a major influx of Muslim immigrants from Asia,
Africa, Europe, and Central and South America. 88
"Islamophobia" may be defined "as an 'exaggerated fear, hatred,
and hostility toward Islam and Muslims"' bolstered by negative
stereotypes, which may result in not only bias and discrimination, but
also may prevent Muslims from being full political and social
participants in American life.89 While many directly correlate the rise
of so-called Islamophobia with the September 11th, 2001 attacks,9 0
others date its origins back to a deep-seated European-Christian bias
against Muslims that was exacerbated by increasing racial tensions in
19th century America. 9
One commentator has sketched a series of triggering events that
occurred prior to September 11.92 The "first triggering event" is the
Cold War. During the Cold War, the United States began its now longstanding support of Israel in conflicts with surrounding Muslim
countries backed by Soviet Russia. 93 This stance caused many
Americans to begin viewing Muslims as enemies of the U.S..94 This is
further demonstrated by the oil embargo instituted by the
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1973 to
protest U.S. backing of Israel.9 5 The second set of triggering events are
as follows: the 1979 Iran hostage crisis, the civil war that ravaged
Lebanon in 1979, the 1991 Persian Gulf War, as well as the 2003 Iraq
War.9 6
As the most recent triggering event, the September 11 terrorist
attacks marked the first time that the American populace had been
directly confronted with the very radical ideology of violent, jihadist
Islam, as interpreted by al-Qaeda.97 Al-Qaeda professed this to be the
"true face" of Islam, and while many commentators at the time (from
politicians to news reporters) emphasized that this was actually an
ideology in opposition to Islam's peaceful nature, others implied that
violence is an inherent component of Islam and many of its followers
intended "Islamization" of America.9 8 This was a pivotal shift in the

See id.
88.
See id.
89.
Asma T. Uddin & Dave Pantzer, A FirstAmendment Analysis ofAnti-Sharia
Initiatives, FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 363, 365 (2012).
90.
See Grunert, supra note 8, at 697; see also Uddin & Pantzer, supra note 89,
at 363 (arguing that since September 11, 2001, American Muslims have "continue[d] to
be surrounded by a climate of fear and distrust").
91.
Fallon, supra note 10, at 160 (citing Curtis, supra note 84, at 710).
92.
See id. at 160-61.
93.
See id. at 160.
94.
See id. at 160-61.
95.
See id. at 161.
96.
Id.
97.
See Grunert, supra note 8, at 697.
98.
Id.
87.
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attitude of many Americans toward Muslims and their religion. The
September 11th attacks led to a rise in discrimination against Muslims
and fear of their faith.99 A proposal to build an Islamic center near
1 00
Ground Zero aggravated such sentiments.
This movement toward fear and discrimination against MuslimAmericans has been further exacerbated by a variety of anti-Muslim
organizations that have proliferated in the United States since
September 11th. The Stop Islamization of America organization
focuses its efforts on spreading a conspiracy theory that MuslimAmericans intend "to take over America and deprive Americans of
[their constitutional rights]."1ox The Center for Security Policy (CSP)another, similar, fear-mongering organization-echoes this theme.1 02
CSP recently issued a "report" called "Sharia: The Threat to America,"
which has been used by them to promote anti-Islam sentiment and
fear.108 These organizations, and others like them, attempt to portray
Islam as inherently violent and Muslims as motivated by a desire to
dominate the United States and all non-Muslims. 104 These
"misinformation experts" hope to create a new definition of Sharia, one
that depicts it as a "totalitarian ideology" or "legal-political-military
doctrine" focused on ending Western civilization. 0 5 Surprisingly, these
groups have had great success over the past decade in organizing
themselves and disseminating their views, mainly by utilizing
grassroots organizations to spread their views to a broader audience. 0 6
Collectively, anti-Muslim groups have succeeded in promoting
their message in at least twenty-three states.10 7 They do so utilizing a
variety of communication techniques, including books and reports,
websites, blogs and even speeches. 0 8 Smaller, more localized antiIslam grassroots organizations, and even some right-leaning religious
groups, have taken up these materials as "propaganda for their
constituency."10 9
The movement has moreover succeeded in influencing politicians'
talking points.1 0 Newt Gingrich, the former Speaker of the United
States House of Representatives, and former candidate for the
Republican Party presidential nomination, once described Sharia law

99.
Fallon, supra note 10, at 161 (footnote omitted).
100.
Id.
101.
Uddin & Pantzer, supra note 89, at 363 (citing WAJAHAT ALI ET AL., CTR. FOR
AM. PROGRESS, FEAR, INC.: THE ROOTS OF THE ISLAMOPHOBIA NETWORK IN AMERICA 9
(2011), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2011/08/pdflislamophobia.pdf).
102.
See id. at 363-64.
103.
See id.
104.
See id. at 365.
105.
Id.
106.
See id.
107.
See id. at 366.
108.
Id.
109.
Id.
110.
See id.
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as "a 'mortal threat to the survival of freedom in the United States and
in the world as we know it."'111 During a debate held in the course of
the 2012 presidential race, Mitt Romney stated, "[w]e're not going to
have Sharia[] law applied in U.S. courts. That's never going to
happen." 1 2
All of this has culminated in a worldview the pits Islam against
the West and causes many to believe that the West is in need of
protection." 3 This view has led further to a fear that Sharia law will
somehow "infiltrate" American law, which, in turn, has resulted in a
movement to ban consideration of Sharia law in the American court
system." 4
During the last few years, more than two-dozen state legislatures
have considered bills proposing a ban of Sharia law from their
courtrooms." 5 David Yerushalmi's model law is the basis for most of
these bans.11 6 Yerushalmi is a New York lawyer and is known as "[o]ne
of the most outspoken advocates of the anti-Sharia movement."" 7
Yerushalmi started a group called Society for Americans for National
Existence in January 2006.118 He posted his first "model law," on the
Americans for National Existence's website. 119 The law sought to
make observing Islam a crime comparable to sedition, charged as a
felony and punished by up to 20 years in prison. 20 In the summer of
2009, Yerushalmi began writing what he referred to as "American
Laws for American Courts."121 These "American Laws" included a
model law that was intended to prohibit "state judges from considering
foreign laws," namely Sharia law, or rulings that Yerushalmi
presumed would "violate constitutional rights in the United States." 2 2
The motivation behind Sharia law bans is the idea that American
courts apply Sharia law and that this is wrong and potentially a threat,
but "it is [actually] unclear how many state cases have [even] taken

111.
Grunert, supranote 8, at 696 (quoting Scott Shane, In Islamic Law, Gingrich
Sees a Mortal Threat to U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2011, at A22, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/22/us/politics/in-shariah-gingrich-sees- mortal-threatto-us.html?pagewanted=all).
112.
Fallon, supra note 10, at 162 (quoting Shane, supra note 111, at A22)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
113.
See Uddin & Pantzer, supra note 89, at 366.
114.
See Fallon, supra note 10, at 161; Uddin & Pantzer, supra note 89, at 367.
115.
See Fallon, supra note 10, at 162.
116.
See id. at 161.
117.
Id.
118.
See Uddin & Pantzer, supra note 89, at 367 (citing Andrea Elliot, The Man
Behind
the
Anti-Shariah Movement,
N.Y.
TIMES,
July
31,
2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/31/us/31shariah.html
[http://perma.cc/B6A7-6FQJ]
(archived Mar. 24, 2015)).
119.
See id.
120.
Id.
121.
Id.
122.
Id.
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Sharia [law] into account." 12 3 For example, in an expansive study of
Sharia in America, Sarah M. Fallon compares cases in which Sharia
law has been taken into consideration to cases that have involved
judges taking Jewish law into consideration.1 24 These cases are mainly
only those "relat[ing] to divorce and custody proceedings or commercial
litigation."1 25
The case to which most proponents of Sharia law bans point is
S.D. v. MJ.R., which is a New Jersey case from 2010.126 In S.D. v.
MJ.R., a woman alleged that her husband raped her repeatedly.12 7
The trial court rejected her claim, emphasizing that the man was
following his Muslim beliefs as regard certain spousal duties that she,
as his wife, was required to perform.1 28 The trial court judge thought
that the religious beliefs of the husband with respect to "the roles of
husbands and wives negated the criminal intent [that was] necessary"
for a sexual assault conviction.1 29 Nevertheless, the appellate court
firmly rejected this view, and the decision was reversed.13 0 This case
thus only goes to exemplify the fact that, in the few cases in which
American law and real or perceived Sharia laws conflict, American law
prevails.131 This coincides with the argument made by Fallon, that the
principle of comity, involving "voluntary recognition" given by the
courts of one state "to the executive, legislative, and judicial acts of
another [state]," prevents the application of foreign law in situations
were it might override state law or constitutional rights. 3 2
Despite these protective mechanisms, many states have
nevertheless attempted to institute such bans. These bans have ranged
widely in breadth. Some create a general ban on the application of
international law. Others specifically outlaw all organizations that
follow an Islamic school of thought. 3 3 These bans can be separated
into three general categories.1 34 The first category includes those bills
that particularly point to Sharia law as both "treasonous" and "antiAmerican."' 3 5 The second category includes those bills that simply
take in Sharia law as one of multiple systems of law such bills aim to
outlaw, systems that those proposing the bills "believe[] are at odds

123.
Fallon, supra note 10, at 162 (footnote omitted).
124.
See id.
125.
Id. (footnote omitted).
126.
See Grunert, supra note 8, at 726 & n.192.
127.
See S.D. v. M.J.R., 2 A.3d 412, 414-18 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010);
Karseboom, supra note 47, at 673.
128.
See S.D. v. MJ.R., 2 A.3d at 422.
129.
See Grunert, supra note 8, at 726.
130.
See id.
131.
Cf. id.
132.
See Fallon, supra note 10, at 165, 171.
133.
See Uddin & Pantzer, supra note 89, at 370.
134.
See id. at 372.
135.
Id.
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with the American legal system." 136 Finally, the third category
includes bills that create a broad and general ban of international
laws.' 3 7
A major case out of Oklahoma slowed the adoption of anti-Sharia
bills. The Oklahoma "Save Our State Amendment," which fell within
the first category of such bans, was successfully contested in the case
Awad v. Ziriax."a8 A Muslim citizen of Oklahoma challenged this ban
shortly after its adoption. Muneer Awad argued that the ban violated
the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. 139 The
Federal District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma held the
40
ban did violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.1
In August 2013, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the
District Court's holding.141
Even though the ruling in Awad v. Ziriax seems to have
significantly chilled the fervor to enact bills banning Sharia law from
American courtrooms, the push for such bans is nevertheless indicative
of substantial underlying fears and concerns regarding the application
of Sharia law in the United States. Such fears and concerns signify a
great societal distrust that could easily lead to further challenges to
Sharia law in the United States, even its application outside of the
courtroom in arbitration.
As regards women, the primary fear is that they may be
"'pressured or coerced into participation, or deprived of rights which
would be guaranteed had the matter proceeded under the jurisdiction
of civil courts."' 142 This risk is particularly high in ADR proceedings

related to divorce, which, as will be explained below, are matters most
often addressed by Muslim religious councils.1 43
Muslim women whose marriage was solely religious are most
vulnerable to any inequalities that may exist in the application of
Sharia, including the view held by some Muslims "'that the evidence of
a man is worth more than the evidence of a woman,"' that women have
inferior property rights, and other similar bases for unequal
treatment. 144 There are three possible permutations of a Muslim
marriage: 1) a "nikah," or a Muslim marriage contract without a civil

See id. at 373.
136.
These bills are sometimes referred to as "foreign or international law bills."
137.
See id. at 374.
See id. at 375; see also Awad v. Ziriax, 670 F.3d 1111, 1132 (10th Cir. 2013).
138.
See Grunert, supra note 8, at 699.
139.
See Awad v. Ziriax, 966 F. Supp. 2d 1198, 1204 (W.D. Okla. 2013); Awad v.
140.
Ziriax, 754 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1306 (W.D. Okla. 2010).
141.
See Awad, 670 F.3d at 1132.
Maret, supra note 6, at 267 (quoting Nicholas Pengelley, Faith-Based
142.
Arbitration in Ontario, 9 VINDOBONA J. INT'L COM. L. & ARB. 111, 112 (2005)) (utilizing
the quote to describe the same concern for Muslim women in the UK context).
See infra Part VI.
143.
Maret, supra note 6, at 269 (quoting Arbitration and Mediation Services
144.
(Equality) Bill (2013) H.L. Bill [20] cl. 3(2)(a) (U.K.)).
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marriage; 2) both a nikah and a civil marriage carried out separately,
and 3) a dual ceremony that results in both a religious and civil
union. 145 While the latter two permutations may be addressed by the
American court system, the first can only be dissolved by the decree of
an Islamic council. In the UK, requests for dissolution of nikah-only
marriages form the majority of cases addressed by the Sharia
councils.1 46 In such a situation, Muslim women have no recourse to
state courts and thus no way of actualizing rights guaranteed by the
state. Yet, in the United States, there is an increasing desire among
Muslim-American communities and mosques to require imams to have
proof of a valid civil marriage before performing a nikah.147 This is
definitely a step in the right direction as regards the preservation of
women's rights of equality under American law, but until it is
widespread, this issue must still be taken into account.
Muslim women are similarly left with few options outside of
Sharia Law in the issue of the "mahr." A "mahr"-typically included as
an element of the Muslim marriage contract-provides for the
"payment of goods or valuable property made by the husband to the
wife."1 48 In common practice, the husband gives only a small portion of
the mahr to the wife at the time of marriage, and then the remainder
is given at either the time of divorce or the husband's death. 149
Problems arise in the American context when women seek to have the
mahr enforced upon divorce. Courts frequently treat the mahr as a
prenuptial agreement, but this can create disadvantages where a state
court finds the mahr to preclude other recovery by the wife, including
alimony or property division, or where courts find it unenforceable due
to a failure to meet state statutory requirements, such as consultation
of counsel or assets disclosure prior to its creation.15 0 There is some
trend in Muslim communities in the U.S. to make the mahr more
compatible with Western law, and so more easily enforced in American
courts, and to have imams declare the mahr to be an irrevocable gift;
this practice still results in great potential disadvantage for Muslim
women in American courts. 15 1 As a result, these women are more likely
to turn only to Sharia councils for enforcement, and thus risk
inequalities under the application of Sharia. Also, given the appeals
process, detailed above, where the resolution of a mahr conflict is

See Shaheen Sadar Ali, Authority and Authenticity: ShariaCouncils, Muslim
145.
Women's Rights, and the English Courts, 25 CHILD & FAM. L. Q. 113, 118 (2013).
146.
See id.
See id. at 119 (noting that no such trend exists in the UK).
147.
148.
Lowry, supra note 56, at 167.
149.
Id.
See id. at 167-69 (describing such results in the New Jersey case Chaudry v.
150.
Chaudry, 388 A.2d 1000 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2014) and the Washington case In re
Marriage of Obaidi & Qayoum, 226 P.3d 787 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010)).
151.
See id. at 169 (noting the "disparate impact" suffered by women from judicial
interpretation of mahr agreements); see also Ali, supra note 145, at 119.
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conducted via arbitration, it is unlikely that any woman dissatisfied by
the decision of the Sharia council will be successful in challenging it.
Also ancillary to the divorce, is the issue of child custody: varying
standards create uncertainty for potential litigants and, as a result,
may, like the above issues, lead women to seek Sharia arbitration
instead. Under Sharia, the presumption, after the child reaches age
nine, is in favor of the father, without consideration of the child's
interests.1 52 This is an even more complicated issue than the previous
two because states have taken a wide variety of approaches in how they
deal with child custody matters, and particularly how they treat
arbitration in this area. 1 53 Some have wholly refused to recognize
arbitration awards in child custody disputes, while others have treated
child custody arbitration decisions as "voidable" if found not to be in
the best interests of the child.1 54 The Supreme Court has adopted a
middle position that involves recognizing the award unless "harm to
the child" results.' 55 The "harm to the child" standard is thus much
less likely to result in the setting aside of an award than the approach
which looks to the best interests of the child. Arbitration of child
custody also poses an issue as regards the voluntary consent element
necessary to arbitrate any dispute under the FAA and RUAA, because
the child's rights are at stake, yet the child, of course, cannot provide
voluntary consent to arbitration. There are no current safeguards in
place to help ensure that parents consider the child's interest when
entering an arbitration agreement.
Wills based on Sharia generally follow inheritance guidelines that
do not treat men and women with an equal hand. Sharia inheritance
traditions involve providing for the surviving spouse, but with a much
higher proportion of the inheritance going to the children of the union
than under American law, with the male children receiving twice what
the female children receive. 15 6 By contrast, American law provides the
surviving spouse with a statutory one-third share of the inheritance
where there are children, one-half where there are not. 15 7 Due to these
major differences, Muslims, especially men, have an incentive to try to
include an arbitration clause in their wills. Yet, this, like disputes over
child custody, creates an issue as regards voluntary consent. Because
heirs would not have given their consent to such a clause, it is unlikely
that any state would enforce an arbitration award on matters of

152.
See Lowry, supra note 56, at 170 (explaining that, according to the Hanafi
school, "the mother retains the right to custody over a boy until he is seven and a girl
until she reaches age nine" (footnote omitted)).
See Lowry, supra note 56, at 171-73 (providing a sampling of different
153.
approaches states take on this issue).
154.
See id.
155.
See id. at 171-72 (describing the approach taken in the case Troxel v.
Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000)).
156.
See id. at 174-75.
157.
See id. at 174.
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inheritance. 158 Nevertheless, because the review process for
arbitration awards is difficult, and may be intimidating to those
disadvantaged by the Sharia system who may not have sufficient
knowledge or access to information on the topic and who may also be
pressured by their communities or family to keep the dispute within
the Islamic council, there is a real risk that such awards may go
unchallenged without recourse to American courts.

IV.

THE CANADIAN RESPONSE TO SHARIA ARBITRATION

Until the creation of the Islamic Institute of Civil Justice (IICJ) in
2003, many forms of religious ADR for family law disputes were
commonplace in Canada.15 9 This was done under the authority granted
by the 1991 Arbitration Act. 160 Like the Federal Arbitration Act in the
United States, the Canadian Arbitration Act permitted parties to
arbitration "to resolve their civil disputes using the legal framework of
their choice."161 Canadian courts, also like courts in the United States,
typically declined to intervene with these religious arbitrations insofar
as the disputes concerned religious doctrine.1 62 Canadian courts only
became involved where individual civil, property, or constitutional
rights were at issue. 163 Such mediations, negotiations, and
arbitrations went largely unnoticed by the Canadian public until the
2003 creation of IICJ.1 64 The IICJ, closely following its creation, made

known an intention to establish a Muslim judicial tribunal, a "DarulQada."1 65 The IICJ intended the Darul-Qada to serve as a Sharia
arbitration tribunal in Ontario. 166
The main concern raised by Ontario citizens regarding the IICJ
was that the application of Sharia law in the binding context of an
arbitration might lead to the creation of a parallel legal system in
Ontario, one which would not recognize the same equality values as
the Ontario system, and so could result in disadvantages for vulnerable

See id. at 175.
158.
159.
See Bakht, supra note 3, at 120 ("Jewish arbitrations have been functioning
in this manner for many years without controversy."); Farrow, supra note 2, at 79 ("In
Ontario, Jews, Christians, Muslims, and others have engaged in religious-based dispute
resolution processes for years." (footnote omitted)).
160.
See Bakht, supra note 3, at 120.
161.
Id.
162.
Id. at 127.
163.
Id.
164.
See id. at 120 (explaining that religious arbitrations occurred without notice
until 2003 "when a group of Muslims announced their intention to create [religious]
tribunals"); Farrow, supra note 2, at 79 (discussing the start of the public debate about
the use of Sharia law in Canada).
See Farrow, supra note 2, at 79.
165.
166.
See id.
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members of Ontario society, namely Muslim women and children. 167
In part, this was because the status quo at the time did not provide for
any review of such processes aside from forms of review that depended
upon party initiative in bringing the matter before a court.16 8 Due to
the fact that much of the concern regarding vulnerable individuals was
based upon ideas of persons having a dearth of information on their
rights under Ontario law or being disproportionately affected by
community and family pressures in choosing arbitration, the status
quo approach to review would likely be inadequate to serve the needs
of these individuals. 169
In response to the concerns of citizens opposed to the IICJ, the
Ontario government gave former Ontario Attorney General Marion
Boyd a mandate to research the operation of religious tribunals in the
realm of arbitration in June 2004.170 This mandate required Boyd to
determine whether concerns, particularly those related to the
disadvantaging of vulnerable individuals, were well-founded, and how
the Ontario government could best deal with them in this situation.' 7
Boyd did not find religious arbitrations to be inherently at odds
with the rights of vulnerable individuals, but she did find that any
concerns would be best addressed through additional safeguards.
Broadly, Boyd recommended that the government modify the process
established by the 1991 Arbitration Act in such a manner as to enhance
all current "checks and balances" instead of relying on party-initiative
to start review processes after a harm is already done.1 72 Boyd released
a report including her findings and recommendations in December
2004. In this report, Boyd recommended family law arbitrations
continue, but only as modified by increased government regulation of
such arbitrations. 173

Boyd advanced such changes as obliging parties to meet certain
"threshold requirements" prior to arbitration, including mandating
that parties to an arbitration agreement be given "independent legal
advice" before making the agreement.1 74 She also recommended that
"escape opportunities" be made available after the arbitration
agreement was finalized, but before commencement of the arbitral
process, that review for "compliance with Ontario Law" be made

167.
See Bakht, supranote 3, at 121-22 (describing the "sharia debate" that went
on for many weeks).
168.
See Shelley McGill, Religious Tribunals and the Ontario Arbitration Act,
1991: The Catalyst for Change, 20 J.L. & Soc. POL'Y 53, 56-57 (2005) (noting the
difficulty in obtaining judicial review of arbitration awards).
169.
See id. at 56-57.
170.
See Farrow, supra note 2, at 79.
171.
See id.
172.
See McGill, supranote 168, at 55-56.
173.
See id. at 56.
174.
Id.
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mandatory, or that such mandatory review be applied in all situations
where a person seeks to have an arbitration award enforced via
Ontario Court provisions. 175 Boyd also recommended stronger
regulation of the arbitrators than of the arbitration award, including
requiring membership in professional organizations with codes of
conduct and the submission of annual statistical reports of appeals and
complaints.' 76 This is, in part, because she intended that arbitrators
serve an additional screening function regarding parties to the
arbitration, examining each for signs of unequal power and/or domestic
violence.1 77 The arbitrator would then be required to "certify" that the
parties entered into arbitration voluntarily and with full
information.' 7 8 Boyd also recommended instituting a public campaign
to inform Ontario citizens of the Arbitration Act, family law and
immigration law issues, general legal rights and obligations, and other
forms of dispute resolution.17 9
In spite of Boyd's research, the Canadian government adopted a
position "that allowing Sharia 'to get a foothold in Canada' would
seriously jeopardize Canadian values." 180 Despite the substantial
research done by Boyd leading to the above recommendations, the
Ontario government announced on September 11, 2005 that the use of
Sharia law in arbitrations of family law disputes would be banned.18
This position was made official in February 2006 via the enactment of
the Family Statute Law Amendment Act, which amends both the
Arbitration Act and the Family Law Act.1 82 This was largely the result
of the massive lobbying and public awareness tactics of feminists and
women's organizations that were strongly opposed to the idea of Sharia
arbitration.' 83

Id.
175.
176.
Id. at 62, 64 ("In this context (multiculturalism) I believe it is important to
seek solutions that attempt not only to respect the rights of minority groups in the larger
cultural and political context of Ontarian society, but also to ensure that individuals
within that minority, as citizens of this province, are able to exercise their rights as
individuals with the greatest of ease and with minimal cultural and personal risk."
(footnote omitted) (quoting MARION BOYD, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN FAMILY LAW:
PROTECTING CHOICE, PROMOTING INCLUSION 94 (2004)).

177.
See id. at 63-64.
See id. at 64 (theorizing that such a requirement might create a "new and
178.
undetermined liability issue" for arbitrators).
179.
See Provins, supra note 6, at 524-25.
180.
Bakht, supra note 3, at 130-31.
181.
See id. at 121-23.
182.
See id. at 140; Farrow, supra note 2, at 80.
183.
See Bakht, supranote 3, at 130 ("In June 2005, the No Religious Arbitration
Coalition was formed. This coalition comprised over 100 organizations and individuals
brought together by the Canadian Council of Muslim Women to actively oppose the use
of religious laws in family law arbitration in Ontario." (footnote omitted)). This coalition
was formed around the belief that Muslim women's rights would be repressed by the
operation of religious law. See id. at 120-21.
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This ban can be seen as actually creating a new harm to exactly
those members whom the government seeks to protect. 184 The Ontario
government may wish to protect women who might not be expressing
a voluntary choice in choosing arbitration due to faith, community, and
family pressures.18 5 Its current stance on religious arbitration may
nevertheless further disadvantage these women. 186 The ban is
considered by some to be excessively paternalistic in that it is
preventing well-educated, well-informed women from making a free
choice to have a dispute settled according to their faith. 8 7 Such an
interpretation of the ban leads to criticism of it as a religiously
discriminatory measure.18 8 There is also the possibility that disputes
will continue to be settled extra-judicially according to Sharia law but
without the protections that state involvement could provide. 8 9
Nevertheless, while these concerns seem most pressing on the
surface, there is some indication that they are not truly warranted,
given the actual wording of the Family Statute Law Amendment Act.
Section 2.2(1) states:
When a decision about a matter described in clause (a) of the definition
of 'family arbitration' in section 1 is made by a third person in a process
that is not conducted exclusively in accordance with the law of Ontario
or of another Canadian jurisdiction,
the process is not a family arbitration; and
19 0
the decision is not a family arbitration award and has no legal effect.

The Family Statute Law Amendment Act does not in fact create a
blanket prohibition of all religious arbitrations. 191 In fact, one
commentator has suggested that the state could never fully prohibit or
adequately police "the practice of faith-based dispute resolution" given
its private nature.1 9 2 Thus, the Family Statute Law Amendment Act
actually reflects the demands made by more moderate women's
organizations, for example: the Women's Legal Education and Action
Fund (LEAF)'s suggestion that arbitrations concerning family law
matters be allowed to include religious precepts, "'but only to the extent

184.
See McGill, supra note 168, at 57-59.
185.
See id. at 58.
186.
See id. at 57-58.
187.
See id. at 58; see also Provins, supra note 6, at 525 (illustrating how the
Muslim religion can be interpreted to require practicing Muslims to resolve their
disputes according to Sharia in order to fulfill their duties under Islam).
188.
See McGill, supranote 168, at 57, 59.
189.
See Provins, supra note 6, at 539-40 (stating that, even though secular law
may restrict some aspects of religious law, it provides an outlet that would otherwise be
closed in a completely secular court system).
190.
Family Statute Law Amendment Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 1 (Can.).
191.
See Farrow, supra note 2, at 81 (pointing out that a ban on tribunals that are
not in accordance with Canadian law does not ban all religious tribunals).
192.
See id.
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that they do not conflict with Ontario family law."'19 3 As a result, the
Family Statute Law Amendment Act can be seen as occupying a middle
ground between a complete ban on the application of all religious
precepts in arbitration and complete recognition of all such
applications. Instead the Family Statute Law Amendment Act
manages to still accommodate those, including women, who wish to
have their disputes settled according to Islamic principles, while still
protecting them from violations of their statutorily guaranteed
rights.1 94 This is because the Family Statute Law Amendment Act still
allows individuals to settle their disputes "on any basis that they
please," so long as that basis is mutually agreed upon (though such
decisions will not automatically be deemed binding). 195 Moreover,
religious arbitrators may still issue decisions that will be deemed
binding by Canadian courts by simply providing that the outcomes of
their decisions conform with Canadian family law.1 96 Therefore, while
many have termed the Family Statute Law Amendment Act as a
complete ban of religious arbitration, it is, in fact, something more of a
middle approach, providing a sort of "balance between religious
97
freedom and equality."'
While concerns remain regarding the fact that the amendments
do nothing to provide any of the other additional safeguards proposed
by Boyd, including the provision of public education and independent
legal advice, some believe it nevertheless paves the way for internal
catalyzing
change within the Islamic community-possibly
interpretive change that will bring Sharia law closer to a position
98
favoring equality of women.'

V.

THE UNITED KINGDOM RESPONSE TO SHARIA ARBITRATION

The United Kingdom's approach to Sharia arbitration has been
characterized as one of, if not actually the most, accommodating

193.

Bakht, supra note 3, at 129-30 (quoting WOMEN'S LEGAL EDUCATION AND

ACTION FUND (LEAF), SUBMISSION TO MARION BOYD IN RELATION TO HER REVIEW OF

THE ARBITRATION ACT (2004)) (noting also that LEAF later changed its position to
conform with the desire of other feminist groups to ban all religious precepts from
arbitration even if they do not conflict with Ontario law).
See id. at 133-34.
194.
See id at 141-42.
195.
196.
See id.
197.
Id. at 143.
198.
See id. (expressing hope that accommodation of Islamic law could "create a
'third space' for Muslim women"); see also Ali, supra note 145, at 122-23 (outlining an
approach to Muslim law that accounts for the "plural identities for Muslims living in
non-Muslim jurisdictions and mutual relationships between Muslim and non-Muslim
communities").
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positions.' 99 Yet, such praise-or such censure depending upon the

position of the critic-is misleading. The UK, in actuality, restricts the
application of Sharia to family law matters, more stringently than even
Canada.
Islamic councils-courts,
albeit ones without statutory
authority-have been allowed to develop in the UK. Councils are
allowed as a result of the view "that they are manifestations of the
Muslim diaspora's need for forums adjudicating on Islamic law." 200
The system of councils has endured public criticism since its inception
in the 1970s. The greatest criticism arose after a the Archbishop of
Canterbury gave a speech in February 2008 in which he proposed
greater legal recognition of the decisions of these tribunals. 201 Public
concern following the Archbishop's speech, similar to the sort of
concerns that sparked Sharia law bans in the United States, prompted
the UK government's Arts and Humanities Research Council to
commission Cardiff Law School to research the family law-related
activities of Sharia councils. 202 The resulting report provided a
detailed overview of the exact legal position occupied by these councils.
In recent years, approximately eighty-five Sharia councils have
operated within the UK. The British government does not oversee the
administration of these councils, but the councils do not lack oversight.
Thirteen of the eighty-five estimated councils are under the
administration of the Islamic Sharia Council, the largest council in the
UK. 203 The publicly active Muslim Arbitration Tribunal (MAT)
oversees many of the others. 204
Family law-related disputes are a major part of the work and
purpose of these councils. These councils are considered "unofficial,
extra-legal" bodies that engage in providing advice on matters of
religious interpretation and practice, resolving disputes via ADR
mechanisms, and providing expert opinions for British courts "on
Muslim family law and other matters." 205 "[Ninety-five percent] of the

199.
Cf. Christopher R. Lepore, Asserting State Sovereignty Over National
Communities of Islam in the United States and Britain: Sharia Courts as a Tool of
Muslim Accommodation and Integration, 11 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 669, 669,
680 (2012) ("Britain has recently conferred legal validity to decisions made by courts that
apply sharia law. . . .").
200.
Ali, supra note 145, at 113.
201.
See Ahmed & Norton, supra note 5, at 364-65.
202.
See id. at 365.
203.
GILLIAN DOUGLAS ET AL., SOCIAL COHESION AND CIVIL LAW: MARRIAGE,
DIVORCE AND RELIGIOUS COURTS 28 (2011); see also Maret, supra note 6, at 255 ("[Alt
least eighty-five Islamic law councils or tribunals currently operate throughout the
United Kingdom." (footnote omitted)).
204.
See DOUGLAS ET AL., supra note 203, at 28; Maret, supra note 6, at 263
(framing MAT's creation in 2007).
205.
See Ali, supra note 145, at 126 (footnote omitted).
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'

case load for Sharia councils [in the UK] encompasses women seeking
[Muslim] divorce."2 06
There are two main ways in which decisions of religious councils
are recognized in the UK. First, the doctrine of "consensual compact,"
which "recognises that the rules and structures of voluntary
associations are binding on assenting members," provides support for
English courts' policy of non-interference as regards the decisions of
such councils pertaining to religious practices, interpretations of
religious texts, etc. 207 Second, courts may recognize a religious
council's decision based on the UK's Arbitration Act of 1996.208
As mentioned above, religious councils are not statutory tribunals,
but they may still serve as arbitral tribunals for the resolution of civil
disputes under the Arbitration Act of 1996.209 Arbitral decisions are
enforceable under the Arbitration Act of 1996 so long as the parties to
the arbitration had a valid arbitration agreement setting out all terms
of the arbitration prior to its occurrence, and the agreement is not
"considered by the courts to be unreasonable or contrary to public
policy." 210 As of 2012, only one Sharia council was recognized by the
state as operating under the Arbitration Act of 1996: the MAT. 21
Further, the Arbitration Act of 1996 only grants authority to decide
civil disputes, which excludes, in the UK, criminal law disputes and
the resolution of family law disputes from the realm of arbitration. 212
It is also worth noting that the Arbitration Act of 1996 provides
immunity for arbitrators as it relates to any of their actions or
omissions occurring during the arbitration unless those acts or
omissions are shown to have been in bad faith.21 3
Some commentary suggests that the Arbitration Act may in fact
actually apply to family law disputes, but simply has yet to be
recognized by courts as doing so. 214 This position is given additional
support by the proposal of the Arbitration and Mediation (Equality)
Services Bill in 2011, which is intended to amend the Arbitration Act
to clarify that the Act gives no authority to arbitrate any matter within
the jurisdiction of family courts. 2 15 The Equality Bill particularly aims
to protect victims of domestic abuse and to further support equality

206.
Id. at 114.
207.
DOUGLAS ET AL., supra note 203, at 10, 16.
208.
See id. at 16.
209.
See Ahmed & Norton, supra note 5, at 368.
210.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also DOUGLAS ET AL., supra note 203, at 16-18
(setting out the limits placed on arbitrations by the Arbitration Act 1996); Maret, supra
note 6, at 262-63.
211.
See Ahmed & Norton, supra note 5, at 368 (noting that the Muslim
Arbitration Tribunal is the "only . . . sharia council [that] currently operates under the
[Arbitration] Act").
212.
See id.
213.
See Maret, supra note 6, at 263.
214.
See Ahmed & Norton, supra note 5, at 369.
215.
See id.
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under the law of arbitration and mediation. 216 The Bill even includes
a provision that would impose a maximum five-year jail sentence on
anyone claiming religious councils have jurisdiction over family law
disputes or criminal matters. 217
The Equality Bill demonstrates the widely held concern in the UK
that Islamic religious councils are involved in family and criminal law
matters to a degree that undermines the equal rights established by
the European Charter of Human Rights (ECHR) and UK legislation.2 1 8
This concern is based in the belief that, due to a general lack of state
oversight, religious councils have increasingly arbitrated matters
beyond just commercial disputes contemplated by the Arbitration
Act.2 19 Under the Arbitration Act, appeal is only possible if all parties

agree to it or the court gives particular leave, and, as a result, is rarely
utilized. 220 Furthermore, the Arbitration Act of 1996 provides
arbitrators with broad immunity. 22 ' This is the exact opposite of one of
Boyd's main recommendations for the Ontario government. 222
Thus, contrary to popular viewpoint, it would seem that the
approach of the UK to Sharia arbitration of family law disputes is
actually stricter than that of Ontario, which allows arbitration, even of
family law matters, so long as the outcome is not contrary to Canadian
law.
VI. COMBATING THE DANGERS TO ARBITRATION UNDER SHARIA
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES

Because the United States actually gives much more autonomy
than either Ontario or the UK to religious arbitration tribunals by
allowing religious tribunals to arbitrate all matters except criminal law
according to their own precepts, the dangers and concerns addressed
by those states potentially pose an even greater risk in the United
States. As recognized in the UK and Canada, the most pressing
dangers of Sharia law as applied in family law matters via arbitration
are those facing members of the Muslim community who have the least
power: women and children.
In attempting to prevent and alleviate some of the harms and
inconsistencies, it must be kept in mind that doing so runs the risk of

216.
Maret, supra note 6, at 256.
217.
See id. (asserting that this "would effectively force Islamic arbitration
councils 'to acknowledge the primacy of English law"' (footnote omitted)).
218.
See id. at 272-73 (describing the English Equality Act 2006 and Equality Act
2010).
219.
See id. at 267.
220.
See id. at 267-68.
221.
See id. at 263.
222.
See McGill, supra note 168, at 64 (analyzing Boyd's recommendation to

regulate the profession by "supervising the quality of the arbitrator").
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infringing upon Muslim religious freedom, as guaranteed by the First
Amendment. 223 Particularly, it should be recognized that many
individuals turn to religious councils in order to fulfill faith-based
commitments. The fourth sura of the Quran-"the An-Nisa"-states
practicing Muslims should refer differences. among themselves to
"Allaah and His Messenger," which has been interpreted as iterating
an obligation on the part of faithful Muslims to have their disputes
settled by Islamic councils. 224 In fact, increasing numbers of MuslimAmericans are said to be seeking such dispute resolution as an "act of
faithful piety." 225 The possibility that some practicing MuslimAmerican women may wish, with full information and freedom of
decision, to refer their disputes to an Islamic council as an expression
of religious piety, should therefore not be discounted. Attempts to
preserve women's rights should not unduly interfere with their
freedom to make this decision. It should also be recognized that, in
some instances, a woman might benefit more by the application of
Sharia law to a dispute than American law. 2 26 While safeguards may
be warranted, freedom of choice in such matters should be preserved.
Potentially the easiest, and the most direct, mode of dealing with
rights-based concerns would be adopting a complete ban on religious
arbitration in family law matters, as is proposed by the Equality Bill
in the United Kingdom. 227 Doing so would ensure that all parties in
such disputes are given the equal protection of their individual rights
under American law. Yet, such a course of action would greatly
undermine the religious freedom of those seeking to resolve disputes
as a matter of piety. Unless the ban were accompanied by a significant
enforcement mechanism, there is the possibility that religious
arbitration on family law matters would continue without state
oversight, despite the legislature's desire that it should not.228 Such a
ban would most likely simply result in religious dispute resolution
mechanisms going further underground, making it even more difficult
for the state to ensure that vulnerable individuals are adequately
protected. Also, a ban of this type would affect not only MuslimAmericans, but also American Christians and Jews who settle disputes

223.
See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
224.
McFarland, supra note 59, at 379.
225.
Id. at 380 (citing Asifa Quraishi-Landes, Rumors of the Sharia Threat Are
Greatly Exaggerated: What American Judges Really Do with Islamic Family Law in
Their Courtrooms, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 245, 253-54 (2012-2013)).
226.
See Quraishi-Landes, supra note 225, at 253-54 (highlighting fiqh provisions
that particularly benefit women, such as those recognizing women's property rights and
compensability of their housework).
227.
See Ahmed & Norton, supra note 5, at 369 (characterizing the Bill as
proposing "to clarify that any matter which is within the jurisdiction of the family courts
cannot be the subject of arbitration proceedings").
228.
See, e.g., Farrow, supra note 2, at 81 (noting the difficulty of enforcing an
outright ban).
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through religious tribunals. Therefore, large lobbying efforts and much
opposition to a full ban could be expected.
Another possibility is adopting the approach of the Ontario
government. While the Ontario approach has received much criticism
by those who believe it to truly be a full ban of all Sharia arbitration,
it is actually a more open approach than the current position of the
UK. 229 Rather than completely banning all religious arbitration in the
realm of family law, American states might instead choose to create
legislation that would render unenforceable all arbitration awards that
are found to be contrary to American civil law upon review. Such a goal
could also be forwarded at the federal level through an amendment to
the FAA. Yet, as with the previous option, this would still undermine
the freedom of choice of those seeking religious dispute resolution as
an expression of their piety in that by preventing enforcement of any
particular provision of a tribunal decision that differs from American
law might render a significant portion of religious tribunal decisions
nonbinding. This would be particularly unfortunate in those areas
where the rights of vulnerable individuals are actually better protected
by their religious precepts than by American law. Nevertheless, these
instances may be few compared to those where protection under civil
law would be advantageous. Also, the same risk as mentioned above
regarding inability to fully enforce such a policy is present here as well.
Either hard-lined stance seems to come with major drawbacks in
terms of enforcement and encroachment into the realm of protected
religious exercise. A potentially better method would be a more
multifaceted approach that is particularly tailored to exactly those
concerns that are most pressing, while leaving areas of core religious
freedom untouched. Such an approach would likely resemble that
proposed by Boyd during the Ontario debate. 230
The threshold requirement advocated by Boyd, which requires
that each party to a religious arbitration receive independent legal
counsel prior to consenting to an arbitration agreement, and also prior
to commencing the arbitral process itself, would greatly help to ensure
that individuals are made aware of their rights under American law
and so are better able to make an informed decision with the
disadvantage of possible ignorance somewhat lifted. 231 This would
particularly be the case where those who provide the independent legal
advice are not only experts in American law, but also experts in Sharia
law, and so better able to help their clients weigh potential options and
outcomes in each venue. While such experts may be few in number
today, it is likely that the rise in the Muslim-American population and
its further integration into American society will result in such experts
becoming less rare; thus, making this a more viable option.

229.
230.
231.

See supraParts III-IV.
See supraPart V.
See McGill, supranote 168, at 56.
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Boyd's recommendation regarding a public education campaign
could be helpful in the United States as well.23 2 Receiving the advice
of independent legal council could be cost-prohibitive to some, and it is
debatable that states (or even the tribunals themselves) would be
willing to take on the costs. Therefore, it is of particular importance to
ensure that those entering into agreements for religious arbitration
have their own education and information to fall back upon. 23
Conducting public campaigns to educate minorities, especially recent
immigrants, on their rights under American law, particularly family
and immigration law and how alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms work in the United States, would doubtless be of great
value. While there is some risk that such a campaign would seem
patronizing, there are many ways in which it could be inoffensively
provided through immigration authorities, settlement organizations,
and the like. 234 The benefits could be expected to outweigh the
potential slight.
Boyd also recommended providing for "escape opportunities" that
would arise after the arbitration agreement was created but before the
start of arbitration proceedings. 235 One such escape opportunity could
be embodied by the requirement that the parties receive independent
legal advice, for the second time, prior to the commencement of the
arbitration, coupled with the ability to void the agreement. While this
approach would be capable of providing additional protections for those
who might change their minds during the interim, it nevertheless runs
contrary to principles of common law contracts because it would create
a high degree of uncertainty in any arbitration agreement. As a result,
this particular recommendation is not here advocated.
Mandatory review based on enforcement is also of limited utility
in this context. Already such review is provided in the American
system. What might be more helpful would be the establishment of a
uniform standard of review, particularly in the area of child custody
matters. A "voidable" approach, as described above, could easily be
expanded to take in the entirety of the family law context by basing it
upon the realization of individual rights guaranteed by civil law. 236
Such an approach would run the same risks as that adopted by the

232.
See Provins, supra note 6, at 524-25 (listing public outreach as a core aspect
of the Boyd recommendations).
233.
See Shelley McGill, Family Arbitration: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back,
21 J.L. & Soc. POL'Y 49, 57 (2007) (discussing the heightened costs associated with the
changes in the Family Statute Law Amendment Act).
For example, this information could easily be added to information given by
234.
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services upon application of citizenship. See U.S.
CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, WELCOME TO THE UNITED STATES: A GUIDE

FOR NEW IMMIGRANTS (2012), availableat http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/
nativedocuments/M-617.pdf [http://perma.cc/569J-6V9D] (archived Feb. 17, 2015).
McGill, supra note 168, at 56.
235.
236.
See Lowry, supra note 56, at 171-72, 178--79 (analyzing voidability in the
context of child custody cases).
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Ontario government. 237 As a result, a lesser standard for voidabilitya "gross violation of rights standard"-might be more appropriate.
Stronger regulation of arbitrators could lead to significant positive
results in this area. Requiring annual reports from religious
arbitrators, which would include statistics related to appeals and
complaints, could allow the state a mode of controlling the quality of
arbitrations without formal review. 238 This would provide soft
pressure, rather than the hard pressure of review. Because it would be
required annually, it would in no way be undermined by individual
decisions and unequal information, both of which undermine the
review process. Included in this recommendation, Boyd also advocated
for requiring arbitrators to certify that parties before them are not
subject to domestic violence or unequal power, both of which could
undercut voluntariness. 239
As described above, a certification requirement of this type could
create new liability issues, which could undermine the function of an
arbitrator. Thus, instead of requiring a certification as such, it is
advocated here that religious arbitrators (or arbitrators generally, in
order to avoid potential accusations of discrimination) undergo
required training that would help them not only to identify power
imbalances and the signs of domestic abuse, but to learn ways of
diminishing the effects of such factors on the arbitration process. This
could then be coupled with a mechanism by which arbitrators who
identify power imbalance or domestic abuse may refer the parties to
counseling or recommend additional legal advice for the disadvantaged
party as regards additional options, especially review processes.
Further, apart from positive recommendations such as these,
there is a recognized potential in the Muslim religion for evolution
through creation of new fiqh. It is thus posited by a variety of
commentators that Islam may gradually bridge the gap between
Western individual rights and Sharia all on its own, due to pressures
from within rather than from without. 24 0 In fact, this is deemed by
some to be particularly mandated within the Muslim religion through
the doctrine of fiqh al-aqalliyyat, which establishes that Muslim
minorities residing in non-Muslim states deserve and have the right to
adapt a "special new legal discipline" that addresses their unique

237.
See supra Part V.
238.
See McGill, supranote 168, at 64-66.
See id. at 62-64.
239.
240.
See, e.g., Ali, supra note 145, at 123 (discussing contemporary fiqh);
Quraishi-Landes, supra note 225, at 255 (asserting that as the American Muslim
community grows, it creates "homegrown Islamic scholars" who begin to bridge the gap
between American law and Sharia law); Jemma Wilson, Note, The Sharia Debate in
Britain: Sharia Councils and the Oppression of Muslim Women, 1 ABERDEEN STUDENT
L. REV. 46, 63 (2010) (describing such trends as occurring via a process known as
"transformative accommodation").
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situation, promoting religious needs that may not be identical to those
of Muslims living in Muslim states. 241
Taking a more open approach as here advocated, which is less
intrusive and more easily adapted to changes in Muslim practice would
help to encourage, rather than hinder, such evolution, and might itself
be reinforced by it.
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